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KEEPING "PRIVATE E-MAIL" PRIVATE: A
PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and
institutions. But laws and institutions must go hand-in-hand
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to
keep pace with the times.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Our present society has expanded tremendously because the
Internet links people via computers in a way that creates the perception
that no physical distance separates people who communicate in
cyberspace. 2 One of the infinite uses of cyberspace is the transmission of
electronic mail, or e-mail.3 E-mail is essentially the core of on-line
activity, because it comprises the most common, basic function that
allows individuals to correspond with one another via computers. 4
Although most citizens consider the right of privacy, such as a citizen's
right of privacy in his or her e-mail, as a fundamental right, the United
States Constitution does not enumerate privacy as a protected right.5
I Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (1816).
2 Cyberspace was first coined in a novel by WILuAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1980).
Cyberspace describes the matrix of interconnected computers on the Internet that allows
people with a personal computer to connect and communicate even though they are
hundreds of miles or even thousands of miles apart. In the future, millions of Americans
will benefit from the High-Performance Computing Act passed in 1991. Congress
designed the federal legislation to bolster the development of a digital information
infrastructure. High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, 15 U.S.C.A. §§5501-5528 (West
1998).
3 See JACOB PALME, ELECrRONIC MAiL 1 (1995).
4 Id. at 4. "The user produces, sends, and usually also receives mail at a ... personal
computer." Id.
5 Although the Constitution does not enumerate privacy as a protected right, the Court in
Camara v. Municipal Court, explained that:
The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a
right of the people which 'is basic to a free society.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949)).
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Therefore, e-mail privacy rights, recognized by today's courts, derive
their primary authority from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
["ECPA"] of 19866 and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution which
specifically prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.7 These privacy
rights play a unique role in the American law that is so vital to any free
society.8 Legislators and judges must protect our most basic and
fundamental personal freedom even though computers and digital
communication technologies present a serious challenge to law
enforcement.9 To maintain a proper balance between the needs of society
and citizens' civil liberties, the American legal system must constantly
react to emerging technologies. 10
Keeping in mind the need for the law to react, this Note has a dual
purpose. First, the Note suggests that the Supreme Court has yet to
capture the true essence of the Fourth Amendment and instead has
strayed from the historical purpose of the Amendment.11 Second, the
6 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of Title 18 of the
United States Code).
7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.8 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 85 (1974)
("The privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment fosters large social interests. Political
and moral discussion, affirmation and dissent, need places to be born and nurtured, and
sheltered from unwanted publicity"). See also Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974) (noting that citizens' knowledge that
each is free to express himself or herself freely "is the hallmark of an open society"). In
contrast, privacy's antithesis, "police omniscience[,] is one of the most effective tools of
tyranny." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 See Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 735
(1988) ("The Fourth Amendment absolutely requires a continuous supervision by the
judiciary [and the legislature] over law enforcement. For the Court [or Congress] to do
any less than this, is to fail in... [their] responsibility to the Framers-of the Constitution
and to the citizenry").
10 Professor Gutterman argues that "[u]nrestrained, over time, technology can steadily
erode our privacy protections, thus making our society terribly oppressive." Id.
11 Many scholars criticize the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 349 (stating that the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is not its "most successful product"); Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic
Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73
IOWA L. REv. 541, 543 (1988) (stating that the majority of scholars agree that the Court's
Fourth Amendment "search" cases "[do] not make sense"); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style
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Note argues that Congress's enactment of the ECPA to protect e-mail
also fails to provide enough protection to satisfy the true historical
purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
Section II of this Note analyzes the historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment and traces the development of the current privacy doctrine
enunciated in the Court's seminal "search" case, Katz v. United States.
12
Section I explores the post-Katz sub-doctrines to demonstrate that these
cases misapply the true spirit of the Katz doctrine and divert attention
from the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment.1 3 Section IV of
this Note explores the nature of the Internet and electronic mail.1 4
Section V examines whether an "electronic communication," such as a
private e-mail, receives enough protection, under the ECPA, to satisfy
the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment in comparison to a
"wire" or "oral" communication. s The section ultimately determines
that the formalistic distinctions, which result from Congress's failure to
sufficiently distinguish an "electronic communication" in "transit" from
an "electronic communication" held in "electronic storage," should
mandate reformed legislation. Finally, Part VI of this Note proposes
modifications to update the ECPA whereby the ECPA provides equal
privacy protection to all communications, especially an "electronic
communication," in order to encourage the growth and use of emerging
communication technologies. 16
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND L.J. 329, 329-30
(1973) (stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment cases are a mess!").
12 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 103-227 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 230-54 and accompanying text.
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H. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Historical Purpose of the Amendment
[I] think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part [in gathering
evidence. 1 7
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has a rich
historical background rooted in American, as well as English, law.18 The
Amendment is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that
grew directly out of the events that preceded the revolutionary struggle
with England, particularly the colonial protest against writs of assistance
and general warrants. 19 As a response to these unreasonable law
enforcement practices employed by agents of the British Crown, the
Framers of the Constitution included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill
of Rights2° to restrain executive power.21 Acting as a bulwark against
police practices that prevail in a totalitarian government,22 the Fourth
Amendment protects citizens from government agents23 who conduct
17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
dissenting). Olmstead, which involved wiretapping of a bootlegger, was finally overturned
in the 1967 Katz decision where the Supreme Court held that government agents had to
obtain a court order to place wiretaps. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18 For the specific text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 7.
19 For a detailed analysis about the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, see JACOB
W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1966). Writs of assistance were judicial orders, which authorized
officers of the Crown to enter and search buildings for smuggled goods. Id. at 31-32.
General warrants were employed to enforce seditious libel laws by granting royal officers
the authority to search out and seize writings that were critical to the Crown. Id. at 21.
20 The drafters of the Bill of Rights intended that it act as a limitation on the federal
government only, but the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which was adopted in 1868. See also Smith
v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855) (recognizing that the Bill of Rights only limits the federal
government); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 33 (1949) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states). See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27
(1886) (stating that the practice of writs of assistance and general warrants explained the
nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment).
21 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Weeks v.
United States. 232 U.S. 383, 389-391 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25
(1886); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3-5 (2d ed. 1987).
22 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 586 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment acts as a wall
against a government that oppresses opposition).
23 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (recognizing that evidence illegally
obtained by a private party acting independently of police direction will not be excluded).
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unreasonable24 searches 25 and seizures.26 However, the drafters left the
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment unsettled.27
The Fourth Amendment contains no language setting forth the
consequences in the event that the government violates the
Amendment's strictures.28 However, over the course of the last century,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that the best method to
enforce the Fourth Amendment in criminal prosecutions was to forbid
the government from using evidence obtained in violation of the
24 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (maintaining that
reasonableness "depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's
right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers"); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)) (the reasonableness of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests"); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (recognizing that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
the "reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a
citizen's personal security").
25 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a search occurs when
government action intrudes into an area where a person has a reasonable and justifiable
expectation of privacy). For a detailed discussion of the Katz decision, see infra notes 55-64
and accompanying text.
26 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (holding that seizure of a person
occurs, when under the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave" when confronted by a government agent). See also
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (expanding the seizure definition to
include a government agent's use of physical force or a person's submission to a
government agent's assertion of authority).
27 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(a), at 5-6 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining
that, unlike the Fifth Amendment, no mention is made barring from evidence the fruits of
a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
28Id.
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Amendment.29  Thus, the "exclusionary rule" evolved to deter
government agents from violating the Fourth Amendment. 3°
B. The Development of the Katz Standard
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy.31
While the Supreme Court formulated the "exclusionary rule" to
protect people against evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment,32 the Court did not explain what constituted a violation.
Although the British government's blatant physical intrusions initiated
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,33 the
Supreme Court's first major Fourth Amendment case, Boyd v. United
States,34 did not involve a physical trespass at all.35 In Boyd, the issue
29 Over a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court began evolving the most effective means
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the "exclusionary rule" now bars the use
in federal or state court criminal proceedings of evidence that a federal or state
government obtains in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886) (excluded evidence in federal court that the federal government obtained
by violating the Fourth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(excluded evidence in federal court-but not state court-when a federal agent partook in
an action that violated the Fourth Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(holding that victims whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the state must
rely on state remedies), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible
in a state court).
30 The "exclusionary rule" operates as a deterrent to government agents who violate the
Fourth Amendment by excluding evidence seized as a result of such conduct, but not as a
punishment to government agents for the errors of judges and magistrates. Nevertheless,
the exclusionary rule is subject to exceptions such as the "good faith" exception. The
Supreme Court enunciated the "good faith" exception in United States v. Leon, when the
Court held that evidence that the government obtained in reasonable reliance on a facially
valid warrant may be used by the prosecution, despite an ultimate finding that the
warrant was not supported by probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913
(1984). In Leon, a neutral and detached magistrate approved a police officer's application
for a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant. Id.
31 AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD 7 (1943).
32 For a private civil cause of action based on a Fourth Amendment violation, see Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (providing a
citizen a cause of action for monetary damages upon proof of injuries, resulting from a
search conducted by federal agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
33 See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
-' 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The only case decided before Boyd of any significance was Ex parte
Jackson, where the Court required, in dictum, that the government obtain a warrant before
opening a sealed letter sent through the mail. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,733 (1877).
35 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619-20. In Boyd, the case was not even a criminal proceeding but a civil
forfeiture proceeding where the government claimed that the Boyd partnership
fraudulently evaded paying custom duties on imported plate glass. Id. at 617-18. A court
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concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute which provided that,
in certain non-criminal cases, the court may require the production of a
person's private papers if the government asserts that the evidence
would help prove a certain allegation. 36 The Supreme Court held that
this mandatory production of certain papers violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.37 Compelling persons to be witnesses against
themselves by using a subpoena to force the production of wanted
papers, the Court reasoned, was no different from the government
merely seizing the papers.38 The method used by the government to
obtain the papers as evidence was not the essence of the offense. 39
Instead, the essence was the invasion of a person's right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property implicit in the history of
Fourth Amendment protection.40 Although the Boyd Court took an
important step by placing a unique value on the nature of the privacy
right,41 the Court's progressive construction of the Fourth Amendment
was short-lived. Two subsequent cases required that a constitutionally
"protected area" be "physically trespassed" by the government before
Fourth Amendment protection could be triggered.42
order, obtained through the forfeiture proceedings, required the partnership to produce
certain invoices that the government planned to use as evidence to prove tax evasion. Id.
3 Id. at 620. The Court stated that "[ilt is not the breaking of... doors," and "rummaging
of... drawers, that constitutes the essence [of a Fourth Amendment violation], but it is the
invasion of [a person's] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property" which calls the Fourth Amendment into question. Id. at 630. The Court
explained that it was not the existence of a physical trespass that made the government's
practices so despicable. Id.
37 Id. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit the government from
wielding arbitrary power and from compelling a person to produce incriminating papers
without cause, because the procurement was merely an insidious disguise of an old
practice that the founding fathers deeply abhorred. Id. The Court also noted that the
Fourth Amendment condemns unreasonable searches and seizures, because the Fifth
Amendment condemns the government from compelling persons to produce evidence
against themselves. Id. at 633. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 7.
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Boyd, U.S. 116 at 633.
39 Id. at 630.
4 Id.
41 See Gutterman, supra note 9, at 649 (explaining that "Boyd chartered a course that placed
the Fourth Amendment upon a 'value-dominated model'").
42 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (holding that when the police entered
defendant's open field to obtain evidence, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
because the special protection accorded to people in their houses does not extend to open
fields); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,464 (1928) (holding that police interception
of telegraph messages did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because oral
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In Hester v. United States3 and in Olmstead v. United States,44 the
Court retreated from its prior holding in Boyd and relied on twin
principles to test the confines of the Fourth Amendment.45 The first
principle, embraced by the Court in Hester, was the "protected areas"
standard in which the Court strictly construed the literal language of the
Amendment to mean that a governmental trespass onto a citizen's open
field did not constitute a "search." 46 The second principle, embraced by
the Court in Olmstead, was the trespass-oriented standard whereby the
Court decided that the government could conduct warrantless taps on a
defendant's telephone to intercept and listen to telephone conversations
if the government did not physically trespass into the defendant's home
or office.47 The Olmstead Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is
only concerned with the government's blatant physical intrusions and
not the mere interception of telephone conversations. 48 Conversations
communications were not the type of tangibles that the Fourth Amendment sought to
protect).
43 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the government charged the defendant with concealing
distilled spirits, as well as other liquor-related offenses, in violation of a revenue statute.
Id. The government obtained its evidence by entering the defendant's open field, some 50
to 100 yards away from the house where the defendant lived. Id. at 58. From this vantage
point, the government saw the defendant in possession of what appeared to be, and what
was later confirmed as, a jug of whiskey. Id. The defendant challenged the government's
conduct, arguing that the government conducted an illegal search. Id. The Court rejected
the argument and held that no search occurred because the government only entered upon
the defendant's open field. Id. at 58-59. Generally, this is referred to as the "open fields"
doctrine. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the government charged the defendants with
conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act because they dealt with intoxicating
liquors. Id. The government obtained its evidence by intercepting messages from four of
the defendants' residences. Id. at 456-57. The government intercepted these messages by
inserting telephone wiretaps, but did not trespass onto any of the defendants' property.
Id. at 457. Olmstead is arguably the Court's first foray into cyberspace jurisprudence.
Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth
Amendment and the Net-wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1102 (1996).
45 See Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L.
REV. 383 (1991). Professor Berner explained the two-part "search" doctrine prior to 1967:
First, Hester held that the "place" must be one that the Fourth Amendment is concerned
with; and second, Olmstead held that the government action must be one that the Fourth
Amendment scrutinizes-physical trespass. Id.
46 The Court explained that "the special protection afforded by the FourthAmendment to
the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to... open fields."
Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
47 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. The Court decided that the Fourth Amendment was not
concerned with telephone conversations because they were not tangible. Id.
4Id. at 463-66. The Court argued that the framers of the Constitution meant to protect an
individual's privacy interest only in regards to those physical items mentioned specifically
in the Amendment: their persons, houses, papers, and effects. Id. at 463. With this
principle in mind, the Court proclaimed that:
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passing over telephone wires, the Court decided, were not the material
kinds of things that the Fourth Amendment protected if the means the
government used to obtain these conversations did not physically invade
a "protected area."49
Writing for the dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis refused to adopt
the majority's literal construction of the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Brandeis wanted the Court to follow the Boyd precedent, whereby the
Court refused to limit Fourth Amendment protection from applying to
the means used by the government to invade upon a citizen's "right to be
let alone."5° According to Justice Brandeis, the true essence of Fourth
Amendment protection guarantees citizens that right of privacy.51 Justice
Brandeis further explained that, at the time our Founding Fathers
adopted the Constitution, force and violence were the only ways for the
government to procure evidence directly from a defendant. But he
emphasized that time works change.5 2  What the framers of the
Constitution could not, and did not, address was the myriad of privacy
concerns that developed as society introduced new technologies that
The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone
messages as of mailed sealed letters. The amendment does not forbid
what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure.
The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
only. There was no entry of the house, or offices of the defendant.
Id. at 464.
49 Id. at 464-65. The Court reiterated that "[tihe amendment itself shows that the search is
to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects." Id. at 464.
Applying this principle, the Court asserted that "[t]he language of the amendment cannot
be extended and expanded to telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendant's house or office." Id. at 465.
50 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also
Gutterman, supra note 9, at 658-59.
51 Justice Brandeis looked back upon the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment and
commented:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For the specific text of the Fourth
Amendment, see supra note 7.52 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
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enabled the government to expose the most intimate occurrences of
citizens without physical intrusion, force, or violence.5 3
C. The Katz Decision: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard
The right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.5 4
In light of Justice Brandeis's reasoning, which focused on the
historical purpose behind the Fourth Amendment's implicitly
guaranteed right of privacy, the Court eventually overruled the notion
that only a physical trespass into a narrowly defined list of places would
constitute a "search."5 5 In the seminal "search" case, Katz v. United
States,5 6 both parties' attorneys tailored their respective arguments to
coincide with the precedent set forth in Hester and Olmstead,5 but the
Court decided to dismantle its traditional twin-principle trespass test and
established a new principle to define the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches.58 The new principle that resulted to
53 Justice Brandeis stated that:
in the application of a Constitution [the Court's] contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. The progress of
science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may some day be developed by
which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Id.
54 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55 See Berner, supra note 45 and accompanying text, for a summary of the two-part test
based on Hester and Olmstead which the Court relied on during this era. For a list of places
that would constitute a search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny prior to 1967, see
Bemer, supra note 45 at 386 n.11.
56 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the defendant made a telephone call in a public telephone
booth to allegedly make an illegal wagering transaction. Id. at 348. FBI agents placed an
electronic recording device on the outside of the booth to record the defendant's
conversation in order to obtain evidence to indict the defendant for violating a federal
statute which prohibited the transmittal of wagering information by telephone. Id. The
FBI agents placed the recording device on the outside of the telephone booth, so that no
physical invasion occurred into an area that the defendant occupied. Id. at 348-49.
57 The attorneys in Katz argued over whether a telephone booth was the type of "protected
place" accorded protection by the Fourth Amendment and whether placing the electronic
recording device on the outside of the telephone booth constituted an actual trespass. Id.
at 349-51. For a discussion of the two-part trespass test, promulgated in Hester and
Olmstead, used prior to Katz, see Berner, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58 The Court rejected the first principle, set forth in Hester, that the Fourth Amendment
applied only to a relatively short list of protected places and recognized that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and
seizures," regardless of the absence or presence of a physical intrusion. Katz, 389 U.S. at
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analyze whether a defendant may invoke the Fourth Amendment in
connection with a particular set of facts was whether the person affected
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the activity
intruded upon.59
While the majority of the Court adopted this new principle for
defining a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, the language found in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion emerged as the foundation for the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test that exists today.60 Justice
Harlan broke his test into two parts: 1) a person must 'exhibit' an actual
or subjective, expectation of privacy;61 and 2) society must be objectively
prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.62 The purpose of
this new doctrine was to escape the formalistic structure of the prior
property-based analysis and to instead declare that the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy rights which society accepts as
reasonable.6
353. The Court then rejected the second principle, set forth in Olmstead, that the Fourth
Amendment only protects against actual physical trespasses, recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects a person's justifiable expectation of privacy regardless of whether
the government made an actual physical trespass. Id.
"The Katz Court reasoned that:
[The defendant] did not shed his [Fourth Amendment] right simply
because he made his calls from a place from where he might be seen..
. One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcasted to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication.
Id.
60 Id. at 361.
61 Id. The subjective prong requires that individuals take actual affirmative steps to
"exhibit" their intention to ensure their privacy. Id. Some commentators contend that the
"inquiry into the particular defendant's subjective state of mind has no place in the
application of the Katz expectation of privacy standard." LAFAvE, supra note 21, § 11.3(c),
at 157.
62 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The objective prong ensures that
expectations of privacy are reasonable. Id. For example, a person cannot expose
something to the "plain view" of outsiders, yet claim Fourth Amendment protection by
asserting a subjective expectation of privacy. Id.
63 See Gutterman, supra note 9, at 663. Professor Gutterman explained the intended effect
of the new doctrine this way:
This view of the fourth amendment was intended to escape the
structure of a formalistic property analysis and to affirm the concept
that the amendment protects certain property rights.... The right of
the individual to be left alone to live his daily life secure against
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While the Katz doctrine expanded the Fourth Amendment's
protection of privacy rights by broadening the scope of what constituted
a "search," the doctrine is inherently limited, because it requires an
individual to form an expectation of privacy and take precautions to
ensure that privacy.64 By focusing on a defendant's lack of objective
manifestation to protect his privacy, the Court, increasingly concerned
with law and order,65 created sub-doctrines which insulated law
enforcement from review when the precautions that the defendant took
to ensure his privacy were insufficient to earn privacy. 66
III. SUB-DOCTRINES THAT LIMIT THE KATZ DOCTRINE
If the Constitution is to be construed to mean what the
majority at any given period in history wish the Constitution
to mean, why a written Constitution and deliberate process of
amendment?67
Since 1967, the Court has limited the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" doctrine and has effectively reduced the ambit of Fourth
Amendment privacy. In other words, even if a person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," certain exceptions may override that
arbitrary invasions by government officials appeared once again to
become the basic value protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
64 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (requiring that an individual form an expectation of privacy to
trigger his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
See also Gutterman, supra note 9, at 664 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protected
Katz's telephone conversation not only because the Court decided that society places a
value on a telephone conversation that entitled him privacy but also because Katz took
self-protective steps to ensure his privacy).
65 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (holding that a law enforcement
officer making a traffic stop may order passengers out of the car pending completion of the
stop).
66 The problem with Justice Harlan's two-part test is that a court has no way of
determining whether a defendant has a subjective expectation of privacy other than by
determining whether the defendant made any objective manifestations to ensure his
privacy. Professor Gutterman explains:
[A] right dependent upon subjective expectations could make the
fourth amendment's application too dependent upon a finding of
objective measures used to protect privacy. . . . Moreover, by
manipulating the importance of the objective factors manifesting
privacy expectations, focus could be deflected from the content of the
amendment's privacy values to the risk of exposure in failing to take
precautions to protect these values.
Gutterman, supra note 9, at 666.
67 Frank J. Hogan, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
cONvENTION, SAN FRANcisco (July 10, 1939).
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expectation. An analysis of these post-Katz cases is necessary to
understand the problems associated with legislating and judicially
enforcing laws to protect e-mail privacy.
A. The Standing Doctrine
A citizen may not exclude evidence from a criminal proceeding
under the "exclusionary rule"68 based upon a purported violation of
someone else's rights because the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is
personal. 69 Although a straightforward rule for assessing whether the
government violated a defendant's personal Fourth Amendment right
cannot be stated, the Court's leading standing case is Rakas v. Illinois70 In
Rakas, the Court retreated from its holding in Jones v. United States71 by
deciding that a defendant may assert Fourth Amendment rights as to
those areas or objects in which the person has a "legitimate expectation
of privacy." 2 To determine whether a person has a "legitimate
expectation of privacy," the Court objectively asked whether the
defendant had the power to exclude others by exercising dominion and
For an explanation of the "exclusionary rule," see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
6 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD ISREAL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.1, at 459-60 (1992)
(explaining that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted
vicariously). Standing is a very important inquiry for e-mail privacy because two parties,
a sender and a receiver, communicate together. If the government intercepted a private e-
mail communication, then both parties have standing to object to the admission of the
communication into evidence under the "exclusionary rule." Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969) (explaining that during a telephone conversation, both parties
have standing to object to a wiretap). A party may lack standing to object to the admission
of an e-mail communication into evidence when one party either consented to the
disclosure of the e-mail to the government or disclosed the e-mail as a result of an illegal
search and seizure by the government. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32
(1980). See also infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the "assumption of the
risk" doctrine).
70 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the police stopped an automobile and ordered the
occupants to exit. Id. at 130. A search of the automobile, conducted without a search
warrant and without probable cause, revealed a rifle under the seat and shells in the glove
compartment. Id. The Court denied the defendant, a passenger, standing to challenge the
illegal search because he was not the owner or driver of the car and had no ownership or
possessory interest. Id.
7362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). In Jones, a
police search of. an apartment, without a search warrant and without probable cause,
revealed contraband. Id. at 259. The Court granted the defendant, a guest, standing to
challenge the illegal search because he was "legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of
the search. Id. at 267. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
72 The Court borrowed language from Katz and stated that "the Fourth Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who
claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
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control.n The Court reasoned that the right to exclude others invariably
stems from the ownership or lawful possession of real or personal
property. 74 As the Court incorporated this doctrine and additional
doctrines, it severely limited the ambit of Fourth Amendment privacy
protection75
B. The Open Fields Doctrine
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, espoused in Katz,
stated in very certain terms that the Fourth Amendment protects people
and not places.76 But the Court, in Oliver v. United States,7 followed the
historical view,7 8 which regarded any property outside the "curtilage" of
the home as unprotected "open fields." In Oliver, the Court held that
even if the police trespassed on private property that the owner fenced
and posted with "No Trespassing" signs, their observations of activities
or objects on that property outside the curtilage of the home was not a
73 The Court asked whether the defendant had "complete dominion and control ... and
could exclude others from it." Id. at 149.
74 Id. at 143-44 n.12. Unlike Jones who had a key, clothes in the closet and previously slept
on the premises and unlike Katz who occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind
him to exclude others, and paid the toll, Rakas did not have any indicia of control to prove
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy to assert standing. ld. at 149.
75 See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's "open fields"
doctrine).
76 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating in clear language that the Fourth
Amendment "protects persons, not places"). For a detailed analysis of the Katz decision,
see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
77 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver, narcotic agents trespassed onto Oliver's property, without
a warrant, by walking around a locked gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign. Id. at
173. The search revealed a field of marijuana about one mile outside the curtilage of the
home. Id. See also United States v. Dunn 480 U.S. 294, 294-95 (1987) (applying four factors
to determine whether an area is within the curtilage of the home: (1) the proximity of the
area in question to the residence; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure
surrounding the entire home; (3) the nature of the uses to which the subject area is put;
and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation). Thus, a barn
located sixty feet from a house enclosed by a fence, not used for 'intimate activities of the
home,' and not protected from observation by persons outside the home's fence, was not
within the curtilage of the home and not the subject of a search when police looked inside.
Id. at 295. For an explanation of the similar "plain view" doctrine whereby no Fourth
Amendment violation occurs when lawfully present police officers view contraband or
evidence of criminal activity from a vantage point which occasions no intrusion into the
privacy of the suspect, see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see
also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (extending the "plain view" doctrine by
holding that the use of drug-sniffing dogs to detect the odor of narcotics in luggage is not a
Fourth Amendment search).
78 See supra note 42-46 and accompanying text (explaining the rule of Hester which
provides that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted
out of doors in open fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home).
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search within the operation of the Fourth Amendment.79 Even though
the effect of the Court's holding in Oliver gave law enforcement officers
the power to trespass onto private property in "open fields," the Court
continued to create an additional doctrine, making the Katz decision even
more vacuous.80
C. The Assumption of the Risk Doctrine: Risk of Exposure
While Justice Harlan's two-part test attempted to capture the
essence of the majority decision in Katz, he based his test on a subjective
expectation analysis stemming from an "assumption of the risk" theory.8 1
The "assumption of the risk" doctrine suggests that a person might
waive his Fourth Amendment protection when he exposes an object or
activity to the general public.82 The Supreme Court has held that citizens
assumed the risk of exposure in numerous cases, particularly when the
defendant conducted an activity outdoors or when a defendant
voluntarily conveyed something to a third party.s3
79 Id. at 179. The court argued that neither "fences nor 'No Trespassing' signs effectively
bar the public from viewing open fields .... [Tlhe asserted expectation of privacy in open
fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable." Id.
80 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the "assumption of the risk"
doctrine).
81 See Gutterman, supra note 9, at 666-67.
82 Professor Gutterman contends that while the Court formulated the Katz decision to
accord technological developments with Fourth Amendment protection, thereby
maintaining society's need for privacy, the risk assumption doctrine was the most
significant factor in limiting the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 670.
83 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (holding that when police used a
helicopter to observe marijuana through the partially open roof and sides of a greenhouse,
no "search" occurred because the general flying public could also observe the activity);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988) (holding that the defendant's trash was
not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because the defendant placed it curbside
where it was readily accessible to animals, scavengers, children, and snoops. The
defendant placed it in a public area for the express purpose of having strangers take it
away); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding that no Fourth
Amendment search occurs when an electronic device is attached to a vehicle in order to
enable police to track its movement because a person driving in public has no reasonable
expectation that movements of the vehicle will not be observed; the beeper does not
intercept or divulge the contents on any communication); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742-44 (1979) (holding that because a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy
that the telephone company will not disclose the telephone numbers he dials to the police,
the use of pen registers to record the numbers dialed from a particular phone is not a
search); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor had
no protectable Fourth Amendment interests in microfilm records of his financial
transactions because by revealing his affairs to the bank, he assumed the risk that such
information would be conveyed to the government). Congress, however, reversed the
result in Miller in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §3401 (1994). In the context
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The consequence of the Court's attempts to apply the Katz
"reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine in the cases which led to the
doctrines set forth above was to reject Fourth Amendment coverage
without questioning whether the Court preserved the meaningful
purpose behind the protection of privacy.84 The Court has a special duty
to protect the right of the people to be left alone when the government
intrudes upon that right of privacy.85 However, the Court's failure to
recognize its obligation to be sensitive to the risks that citizens assume in
a free and open society has led it to ignore the historical purpose of the
Amendment. According to the Constitution, the Fourth Amendment
was to act as a limitation upon the exercise of governmental power.86 No
part of today's society needs more protection from the exercise of
government power than the greatly increasing number of citizens who
communicate by sending and receiving electronic mail via the Ihternet.87
IV. THE INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
Progress imposes not only new possibilities for the future but
new restrictions.88
A. The Internet
The Internet, originated as a network of computers that began as an
experiment of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Project
Agency ("ARPA") and was called the Advanced Research Project
Agency Network ("ARPANET").89 The ARPA designed the Internet as a
of e-mail, these cases demonstrate that while both parties to a conversation have standing
to object to the interception of their conversation, each assumes the risk that the other
might reveal the information to the government, depriving the person of standing to
exclude the admission of the communication into evidence.
84 See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the Fourth
Amendment). See also Gutterman, supra note 9, at 671 (explaining that "the Court failed to
assess the effect that the uncontrolled government activity would have on our daily
lives").
85 See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the Fourth
Amendment).
86 See id. See also Gutterman supra note 9, at 731-32 (describing how the Court has come
full circle back to the decision in Olmstead because of the Court's bias toward the needs of
law enforcement).
87 See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text (explaining the Internet and electronic
mail).
88 NORBERT WIENER, THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS (1954) (leading mathematician
and pioneer in the mathematics of computer theory, who originated the term
"cybernetics").89ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 831 (E.D. Pa 1996). This network linked computers and
computer networks owned by the military, defense contractors, and university
laboratories conducting defense-related research. Id. As ARPANET evolved far beyond
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decentralized network of computer networks that formed a single
network of redundant links, capable of automatically re-routing
communications if a military attack or simple technical malfunction
damaged one of the links.90 One type of communication sent over this
redundant series of linked computers was "electronic mail."91
B. Electronic Mail
"Electronic mail," more commonly referred to as "e-mail," is a form
of private communication in which the sender of an e-mail message uses
a keyboard to type a message into a computer and a modem to transmit
the message over a telephone line to a recipient via the Internet.92 The
Internet uses a universal protocol, called Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
("SMTP"), to transfer e-mail.9 However, e-mail messages sent between
computers on the Internet do not necessarily travel entirely along the
same path.94
Most networks that transmit e-mail through the Internet use the
"store-and-forward" method.95 Under the store-and-forward method,
the sending computer subdivides a message into smaller "packets"
marked with the destination address of the recipient and a code marking
the packet's sequence number within the whole message.96 The sending
computer then transmits the smaller "packets" to the nearest
its research origins, it became known as "DARPA INTERNET" and finally just the
"Internet." Id.
90 Id. The ARPA designed the network to be a decentralized, self-maintaining series of
redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of transmitting
communications without human control and with the automatic ability to re-route
communications if a nuclear war damaged one of the links, so that vital communications
could continue. Id. The collection of these many different networks use a common
protocol called Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol ("TCP/IP") so that all the
computers on the network speak the same language despite their main operating system.
See HARLEY HAHN & RiCK STOUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 29-30 (1994).
91 See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing "electronic mail").
9 See PALME, supra note 3, at 4.
93 See id. at 129. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is part of the TCP/IP family of
protocols, which transfer mail from one host computer to another on the Internet. Id. See
also HAHN & STOUT, supra note 90, at 68-69. If e-mail is sent from one network to another
network with a different protocol than SMTP, the message has to be routed through a
gateway. See PALME, supra note 3, at 174. Private commercial networks, such as America
Online or CompuServe route e-mail through a gateway that converts the e-mail from
SMTP format to their proprietary standard or vice versa. Id. Nevertheless, the entire
process is nearly a seamless process of sending, routing, gatewaying if necessary, and
finally receiving. See id. at 153-56.
94ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. See also HAHN & STOUT, supra note 90, at 30.
91 See PALME, supra note 3, at 59-62.
96 See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 90, at 30.
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intermediate computer called a station.97 The station further transmits
the smaller "packets" to other intermediate stations until all of the
packets reach the receiving computer where the "packets" line up in
sequence.98 Then the receiving computer reassembles the "packets" and
places the communication into the recipient's e-mail mailbox account.99
While all "packets" of a particular message sometimes travel along the
same path to the destination address, if one of the stations along the
route becomes congested, then some of the "packets" can be re-routed
along the path of least resistance to less congested stations. 100 In order to
protect the privacy of these "packets," Congress enacted legislation that
attempted to balance Fourth Amendment protections with emerging
technologies.101
97 See PALME, supra note 3, at 60.




01See infra notes 103-227 and accompanying text (discussing the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act).
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V. THE PRIVACY OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
Gentlemen [and ladies] do not read each other's mail.10 2
Congress enacted the Federal Wiretap Act in Title 1Il of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968103 in response to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Katz and Berger.1° 4 Because Congress worried that
newly developed means of eavesdropping posed a serious threat to
privacy rights, the Act aimed to protect the privacy rights of "wire" and
"oral" communication by prohibiting private interception.lrs Likewise,
the Act provided strict guidelines for government interception. 1°6
In 1986, Congress broadened the Act to include an "electronic
communication" 1°7 and renamed it the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA").10 8 The ECPA consists of Title I and Title II as
codified in chapters 119109 and 121,110 respectively, of Title 18 (Crimes
and Criminal Procedure) of the United States Code ("U.S.C."). In this
section, this Note examines what protection Title I and Title II provide an
"electronic communication,". when the protection applies, and what
protection Title I and Title II do not provide.
102 HENRY L. STIMsON, ON ACrIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 7 (1948).
103 Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994)).
104 See supra note 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Katz decision of 1967). Also
in 1967, the Court decided Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the Court
held that any form of electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, must satisfy certain
requirements: the warrant must describe with particularity the conversations to be
overheard, show probable cause that a specific crime has been or is being committed, limit
the time period for the surveillance, name the suspects to be overheard, require a return to
the court to show what conversations were intercepted, and must terminate when the
government obtains the desired information. Id. at 59-60. See also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at
10 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (explaining that Congress passed the
act to satisfy Berger and Katz).
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (1994).
106 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
107 The ECPA encompasses many formerly unprotected modes of communication by
redefining the term "electronic communication." See infra note 113 (defining "electronic
communication").
108 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3117, 3121-3127 (1994). This Note argues that with
Fourth Amendment protection in doubt because of the Court's lack of focus on the true
Katz standard, the ECPA must be reworked to give private e-mail the true protection that
the Fourth Amendment intended to give all private communications.
109 For chapter 119 (Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of
Oral Communications), see 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
110 For chapter 121 (Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access), see 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). See also EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO
MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW 168 (1996).
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A. Title I: The Interception and Disclosure of Electronic Communications
Title I of the ECPA proscribes the unauthorized interception of
"wire,""' "oral," 1 2 or "electronic"" 3 communication and the use or
disclosure of an intercepted "wire," "oral," or "electronic"
communication." 4  In regard to an e-mail communication, any
government employee who commits either of the following two actions
without a court order violates the ECPA." 5 First, a person n1 6 acts in
violation of the ECPA if that person intentionally "intercepts" or
endeavors to "intercept" any "electronic communication" while in
transmission." 7 Second, a person acts in violation of the ECPA if that
person intentionally uses or discloses or endeavors to use or disclose the
"contents"" 8 of any "electronic communication" while knowing or
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
I"I Section 2510 (1) defines "wire communication" as:
any aural transfer in whole or in part through the use of facilities for
the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications
or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such
term includes any electronic storage of such communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
112 Section 2510(2) defines "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any
electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994).
"1 Section 2510(12) defines "electronic communication" as:
any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include-(a) any
wire or oral communication; (b) any communication made through a
tone-only paging device; (c) any communication from a tracking
device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or (d) electronic funds
transfer information stored by a financial institution in a
communications system used for electronic storage and transfer of
funds.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
115 See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. See also CAVAZos & MORIN, supra note
110, at 17.
116 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (6). Section 2510 (6) defines a "person" as "any employee, or agent of
the United States or any State or of a State of political subdivision thereof...." Id.
"17 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (a)-(b) (1994).
118 Section 2510 (8) defines "contents" as "any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1994).
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interception of an "electronic communication." 119  Both of these
violations can only occur after an unauthorized interception. 120
While the ECPA makes it illegal for any person, including a system
operator, to intercept or disclose an e-mail communication to anyone
other than the addressee or intended recipient of such communication, 121
the Act does not prohibit a system operator from disclosing the contents
of a communication to a law enforcement agency in any of four
situations. First, a system operator may divulge the contents of a
communication if authorized under section 2511(2)(a) or 2517.122 Second,
a system operator may divulge the contents of a communication with the
lawful consent of either the sender or the intended recipient of such
communication. 23 Third, a system operator may divulge the contents of
a communication to whomever it is necessary to forward the
communication to its destination.124 Lastly, a system operator may
divulge the "contents" of an inadvertently obtained communication that
appears to pertain to the commission of a crime, but only to a law
enforcement agency.125
When the government conducts an authorized interception or
surveillance on a particular system, the ECPA places restrictions on a
system operator.126 No provider of an "electronic communication
119 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d) (1994).
120 Section 2510 (4) defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
121 Section 2511(3)(a) states that "an electronic communication service to the public shall
not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication... while in transmission on
that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication...." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (1994).
12 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(i) (1994). Section 2511 (2) (a) is overly broad because by its terms
it allows:
a provider of... electronic communication service... to intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights
or property of the provider of that service, except . . . random
monitoring... [done other than] for.., quality control checks.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1994) (emphasis added). See also section 2517, "Authorization for
disclosure and use of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. §
2517(1994).
12318 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(ii) (1994).
124 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iii) (1994).
125 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iv); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that
section 2511(3)(b)(i) is overly broad and allows system operators too much discretion).
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) (1994).
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service" 127 or any of its employees can disclose the existence of any
interception, surveillance, or disclose the device used to accomplish the
interception or surveillance, unless required to by the legal process. 128 In
addition, authorized disclosure may occur only after prior notification to
the Attorney General or to the principal prosecuting attorney.129 Any
unauthorized disclosure renders the "electronic communication service"
or particular employee liable for civil damages."3°
The ECPA also permits any government attorney or state law
enforcement officer to make an application for a pen register 131 or trap
and trace device' 32 to a court of competent jurisdiction. 133  Upon
application, the court can enter an ex parte order authorizing the
installation and use of either device, if the information sought is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation.TM As with other parts of the ECPA,
these provisions indicate a congressional codification of the Court's prior
holding in cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 135 For example, a
person can lawfully "intercept" an "electronic communication," when
such person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties
to the communication gave prior consent to such interception. 13' In
addition, a person can lawfully "intercept" or access an "electronic
communication" made through an "electronic communication system" 137
17 Section 2510(15) defines an "electronic communications service" as "any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (1994).
128 Id.
129 1d.
130 Id. For recovery of civil damages, see 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994).
131 Section 3127(3) defines a "pen register" as "a device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted
on the telephone line to which such device is attached .... ." 18 U.S.C § 3127(3) (1994).
132 Section 3127(4) defines a "trap and trace device" as "a device which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an
instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted." 18
U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994).
13 Section 2511(2) (h) makes it lawful "to use a pen register or a trap and trace device ..
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h) (1994). For the application guidelines for the order of a pen register
or a trap and trace device, see 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (a)-(b) (1994).
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994).
135 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (holding that because a defendant
has no reasonable expectation of privacy that the telephone company will not disclose the
telephone numbers he dials to the police, the use of pen registers to record the numbers
dialed from a particular phone is not a search). See also supra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text (explaining the "assumption of the risk" doctrine).
13 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1994). See also supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text
(explaining the "standing" doctrine).
137 Section 2510(14) defines an "electronic communication system" as "any wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic
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that is configured so that such communication is readily accessible to the
general public.138
Although the ECPA protects e-mail and other forms of "electronic
communication" from private interception, the law fails to afford
"electronic communication" the same protection from government
interception that a "wire" or "oral" communication receives.139 First, an
"electronic communication" may be intercepted for any federal felony
whereas a "wire" or "oral" communication may be intercepted for only a
handful of enumerated offenses1 4° Second, an application to a federal
judge for a court "intercept" order to obtain an "electronic
communication" may be approved by the Attorney General, any U.S.
Attorney, or any authorized Assistant Attorney General or Assistant U.S.
Attorney.141 In contrast, an application to a federal judge for a court
"intercept" order to obtain a "wire" or "oral" communication may only
be approved by specifically designated attorneys in the Criminal
Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office located in Washington, D.C.'4
Third, an "electronic communication" may be suppressed only through
the judicially created "exclusionary rule" when a constitutional violation
occurs,143 whereas a "wire" or "oral" communication may be suppressed
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the
electronic storage of such communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 14) (1994).
'- 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1994). See also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text
(explaining the "assumption of the risk" doctrine).
139 See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. See also Michael S. Leib, E-mail and the
Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic Communication to Title IIl's Statutory
Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a "Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393,
406-9 (1997).
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1994). Section 2516 (3) states that "any attorney for the
Government (as such term is defined for purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure) may authorize an application to a Federal judge . . . for . . . an order
authorizing.., the interception of electronic communications when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of any Federal felony." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3). Moreover,
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure defines a "government attorney" as the "Attorney
General, any U.S. Attorney, or any authorized Assistant Attorney General or Assistant U.S.
Attorney." Fed. R. Crim. P. 54 (c). In comparison, section 2516(1)(a), (b), and (c) state that
specifically designated attorneys in the Criminal Division located in Washington, D.C.,
"may authorize an application to a Federal judge... for,. . . an order authorizing... the
interception of wire or oral communications ... when such interception may provide or
has provided evidence of" a list of crimes such as the sabotage of nuclear facilities, treason,
espionage, murder, kidnapping, or Presidential assassination. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a), (b),
(c) (1994).
141 See supra note 140.
142Id.
1 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (explaining how the "exclusionary rule"
forbids the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). See
also supra notes 55-83 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes a violation of
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through the statutorily created "exclusionary rule" whenever the
violation of a "central" 144 provision of the ECPA occurs.14 5 These three
distinctions pose a serious threat to the use of new technologies, because
citizens will forgo the use of new technologies in favor of older
technologies that provide more privacy protection from government
interception. 146 However, fear of government interception poses only
half of the problem. An even greater threat to the privacy of e-mail
communications is government access to a stored "electronic
communication." 147
the Fourth Amendment). If a person or the government illegally intercepts an "electronic
communication," but commits no constitutional violation, then the only remedies or
sanctions available against the person or government are criminal or civil in nature, under
section 2511(4)(a) and section 2520. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2520 (1994). Moreover,
section 2518(10)(c) reads that "[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter [18
U.S.C. 2511(4)(a) and 2520] with respect to the interception of electronic communications
are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations .... 18
U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c).
14 See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974) (holding that only an error in an
application that affects a "central" or "functional" provision of Title In of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 will trigger the statutory suppression remedy).
145 Section 2515 states that.
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer;
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994). In addition, section 2518 states that:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before
any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence
derived therefrom, on the grounds that-(i) the communication was
unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval
under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the
interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval ....
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10)(a).
146 The framers of the Constitution founded the United States on the basis that a free
society requires that each citizen have the ability to communicate freely, openly, and
privately without fear of government eavesdropping. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14 7 See infra notes 148-227 and accompanying text.
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B. Title II: The Access to and Disclosure of Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications
Title Hl of the ECPA proscribes most access to and disclosure of a
stored "wire" or "electronic communication. " 148  In regard to the
unauthorized "access" of a stored private e-mail communication, the
ECPA has a dual purpose.149 First, the ECPA outlaws most unauthorized
private access. °50  Second, the ECPA provides prerequisites for
government access.' 5' A government entity may require an "electronic
communication service" to disclose the contents of an "electronic
communication" held in "electronic storage" for 180 days or less only
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. 5 2 In comparison, a
government entity may require an "electronic communication service" to
disclose the contents of an "electronic communication" held in
"electronic storage" for more than 180 days pursuant to a warrant,
administrative subpoena, or court order. 5 3 Unlike a warrant supported
by probable cause, an administrative subpoena requires no factual basis
and a court order requires a mere offering of "specific and articulable"
facts showing reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of an
"electronic communication" are relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation. 5 4  Thus, the ECPA provides less protection for an
"electronic communication" held in "electronic storage," especially when
compared to a "wire communication" held in "electronic storage." 53
148 18 U.S.C §§ 2701-11 (1994). The victim of an unauthorized access or improper
disclosure of a private "electronic communication" has a civil cause of action. 18 U.S.C. §
2707 (1994).
149 See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
150 Section 2701(a)(1) makes it unlawful to "intentionally access without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided." 18 U.S.C. §
2701(a)(1) (1994). In addition, section 2701(a)(2) makes it unlawful to "intentionally
exceed[] an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtain[], alter[], or prevent[]
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage...
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2) (1994). A person who violates section 2701(a) may suffer
penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (1994). However, section 2701(c) provides exceptions.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1994). In particular, section 2701(c)(3) provides exceptions with
respect to government conduct authorized in section 2703, 2704, or 2518. 18 U.S.C. §
2701(3) (1994). See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (explaining the exception for
government conduct in section 2703).
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).
152 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
15318 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(d).
15418 U.S.C. § 2704(d).
155 See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (explaining that an "electronic
communication" held in "electronic storage" does not receive the same protection as a
"wire communication" held in "electronic storage").
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Although the ECPA provides some protection for e-mail and other
forms of "electronic communication" held in "electronic storage," the
law does not provide an "electronic communication" the same level of
protection from government access that a "wire communication"
receives. 156  Government access to a stored "wire communication"
requires an intercept order,1 ' whereas the government can access a
stored "electronic communication" through a warrant, subpoena, or
court order. 5 8 In other words, a stored "wire communication" receives
the strict protection found in the Title I court "intercept" order, whereas
an "electronic communication" receives the less stringent protection
found in Title II.159
In regard to the "disclosure" of a stored "electronic communication"
in the form of a private e-mail, the ECPA proscribes a person or entity
providing an "electronic communication service" to the public from
knowingly divulging to anyone the "contents" of a communication while
in "electronic storage."16° However, an "electronic communication
service" may divulge the "contents" to an addressee or intended
recipient of such communication1 61 or to a person whose facilities are
used to forward a communication to its intended destination.162
Likewise, an "electronic communication service" may divulge the
contents of an "electronic communication" that may be necessarily
incident to the rendition of that service, such as to protect the property of
the service163 or as otherwise authorized in other sections of the ECPA. 164
Lastly, if the "electronic communication service" inadvertently obtains
the contents of an "electronic communication" that appear to pertain to
156 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.
15 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2218 (1994).
1558 See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
159 The distinction lies in the definitions of a "wire communication" and an "electronic
communication." The definition of a "wire communication". includes any storage of
such communication," implying that the access to a stored "wire communication" remains
protected under Title I. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994). In comparison, the definition of an
"electronic communication" does not include any storage of such communication. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (12). For the definition of an "electronic communication," see supra note 113.
The storage of an "electronic communication" is not included in section 2510(12) because
access to a stored "electronic communication" is protected under Title H. See 18 U.S.C. §
2701 (1994).
M 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
161 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) ("or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient").
162 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(4) ("to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used
to forward such communication to its destination").
163 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) ("as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of such service
or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service").
164 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) ("as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of
this title").
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the commission of a crime, then the service provider may divulge the
contents to the government.16
A court first interpreted the ECPA in Steve Jackson Games v. United
States Secret Service,166  a case involving a stored "electronic
communication" in the form of a private e-mail. In an early morning
raid on March 1, 1990, the Secret Service searched the offices of Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. ("SJG"), a role-playing games publisher.167 The
Secret Service suspected that SJG was a haven to the "Legion of Doom"
("LOD"), a loose association of notorious hackers 68 who apparently stole
a sensitive and proprietary document detailing the operation of Bell
South's Emergency 911 ("E911") telephone system.169 Hence, the Secret
Service obtained a warrant to search SJG.170 But soon after the Secret
16 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6).
166 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
167 Id. at 437. SJG publishes books, magazines, box games, and related products. Id. at 434.
In addition, SJG operates an electronic bulletin board system ("BBS") called "Illuminati,"
named after one of the company's most successful products. Id. The BBS:
posts information to the inquiring public about Steve Jackson Games'
products and activities; provides a medium for receiving and passing
on information from the corporation's employees, writers, customers,
and its game enthusiasts; and finally, affords its users electronic mail
whereby, with the use of selected passwords, its users can send and
receive private e-mail ....
Id.
168 See CAVAZOS & MoRiN, supra note 110, at 22. A "hacker" is an individual who accesses
a computer system without authority. Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 435 n.2.169 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 436.
170 The search warrant authorized the seizure of:
Computer hardware (including, but not limited to, central processing
unit(s), monitors, memory devices, modem(s), programming
equipment, communication equipment, disks, and prints) and
computer software (including, but not limited to, memory disks,
floppy disks, storage media) and written material and documents
relating to the use of the computer system (including networking
access files), documentation relating to the attacking of computers and
advertising the results of computer attack (including telephone
numbers and licensing documentation relative to the computer
programs and equipment at the business known as Steve Jackson
Games which constitute evidence, instrumentalities and fruits of
federal crimes, including interstate transportation of stolen property
(18 USC 2314) and interstate transportation of computer access
information (18 USC 1030 (a)(6)). This warrant is for the seizure of the
above described computer and computer data and for the
authorization to read information stored and contained on the above
described computer and computer data.
Jim Thomas & Gordon Meyer, Secret Service Search Warrant Affidavit, 2 COMPUTER
UNDERGROUND DIGEST 2.11 (November 13, 1990)
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Service executed the search warrant, the Agency learned that the
connection between SJG and the LOD or the E911 document was
erroneous."" While one of SJG's employees, a co-systems operator,1' 2
claimed membership in the LOD and was writing a fantasy role-playing
game about computer hacking, not a scintilla of evidence indicated
illegal activity at the company.' 3 The Secret Service made a mistake and
erroneously believed that the Agency harbored substantial criminal
information.174 But the evidence was obviously insufficient as the Secret
Service neither arrested nor filed any criminal charges against any
member of SJG, including the co-systems operator.175
Nevertheless, during the raid of SJG, the Secret Service seized three
computers, primarily targeting the computer used for the company's
bulletin board system ("BBS"). 176 The BBS stored private e-mail on the
computer's hard disk drive temporarily until the addressees used their
computers and modems to remotely access the BBS and receive their e-
mail."'" After receiving and reading their e-mail, the recipients chose to
either delete the e-mail permanently or to store the e-mail on the BBS
computer's hard disk drive."'8
At the time of the raid, the Secret Service seized 162 items of unread,
private e-mail"79 from some of the 365 BBS users.18s Consequently, the
intended recipients of the unread, private e-mail, along with Steve
http://www.sjgames.com/SS/affidavit.html; Brief for Appellant at Record Excerpts,
Attachment B.
17 CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 110, at 23.
172 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that Loyd Blankeship
was a co-systems operator of the Bulletin Board System ("BBS") and had the ability to
review and delete any data on the BBS).
17 The court proclaimed:
Importantly, prior to March 1, 1990 (the date that the Secret Service
raided SJG), and at all other times, there has never been any basis for
suspicion that any of the Plaintiffs [SJG, Steve Jackson, Elizabeth
McCoy, Walter Milliken, or Steffan O'Sullivan] have engaged in any
criminal activity, violated any law, or attempted to communicate,
publish, or store any illegally obtained information or otherwise
provide access to any illegally obtained information or to solicit any
information which was to be used illegally.
Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 435.
174 Id. at 437.
17 Id.
176 Id. During the search of SJG, the Secret Service seized three computers, over 300
computer disks, and other materials. Id.
17 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458.
17 Id.
179 Id. at 459.
180Id.
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Jackson and his company, sued the Secret Service because it opened,
read, and deleted their private e-mail.181 In other words, the plaintiffs
claimed that by seizing the BBS and accessing their private e-mail stored
on its hard disk drive, the Secret Service illegally intercepted and
disclosed private communications in violation of both Title 1182 and Title
I183 of the ECPA.184
After reviewing Title I and Title II, the district court held that the
Secret Service did not "intercept" the plaintiffs' e-mail in violation of
Title 118 because the Secret Service did not acquire the e-mail
contemporaneously with its transmission.186 But the district court also
held that the Secret Service did disclose and use, without authorization,
all of the private e-mail stored on the BBS in violation of Title Hl18
Because the Secret Service violated Title II of the ECPA, the district court
181 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 438. While the Secret Service denied that the
Agency's personnel read the private e-mail and specifically alleged that the Agency only
used a key word search to review the e-mail, the court found that the preponderance of the
evidence, including common sense, established that the Secret Service did read all of the e-
mail seized and did delete certain information. Id. In fact, the court noted that the Secret
Service worded the search warrant so that all information would be "read." Id. at 438 n.5.
See also supra note 170 for the text of the search warrant.
182 For a thorough discussion of Title I of the ECPA §§ 2510-2521, see supra notes 111-46.
13 For a thorough discussion of Title H1 of the ECPA §§ 2701-2711, see supra notes 148-227.
184 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 434. The plaintiff's lawsuit also stated a cause of
action pursuant to the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000aa. Id. But that claim is
outside the scope of this Note and will not be addressed.
15 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 432 (declining to find liability for any plaintiff
pursuant to the Title I).
186 The district court relied on United States v. Turk, a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case
interpreting "intercept" under Title Ell of the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968. United States v.
Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). In Turk, law enforcement
officers who arrested two men for transporting cocaine and firearms, seized, and played
two cassette tapes without obtaining a warrant. Id. at 656. Subsequently, the government
used the information taken from these recordings to convict the defendant of perjury. Id.
at 657. As a defense, the defendant claimed that the officers illegally intercepted the
private communication under the Federal Wiretap Act. Id. The Turk court analyzed the
definition of "intercept" under the Act and concluded "that an 'intercept' requires, at the
least, involvement in the initial use of the device contemporaneous with the
communication to transmit or preserve the communication." Turk, 526 F.2d at 658 n.3. In
other words, the Turk court concluded that an "intercept" "require[s] participation by the
one charged with an 'interception' in the contemporaneous acquisition of the
communication through the use of the device." Id. at 658.
187 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 443 (finding that the Secret Service exceeded its
authority under Title II); see also Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459 (explaining that the
Secret Service violated Title Ul when it seized stored e-mail without complying with the
statutory provisions).
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awarded each individual plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages188 along
with attorneys' fees and court costs in bringing the suit.189 However, the
statutory damage award under Title II did not satisfy the plaintiffs, and
they appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 90 In the
court of appeals, the plaintiffs claimed that the Secret Service illegally
intercepted their private e-mail in violation of Title 1191 and that Title I
entitled them to a $10,000 statutory damage award.1 92
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the narrow
issue of whether the seizure of the BBS which contained private e-mail
that had been sent, but not yet received (read) by the recipients,
constituted an "intercept" proscribed by Title 1.193 To decide the issue,
the court of appeals analyzed many of the ECPA's technical terms
defined in section 2510.194 First, the court of appeals examined the
definition of an "electronic communication,"195 an "intercept,"1 96 an
"aural transfer," 197 and "electronic storage."1 98 Second, the court of
appeals noted that, unlike the definition of a "wire communication"
which includes any "electronic storage" of such communication, the
definition of an "electronic communication" does not include the
188 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 443. Title II awards statutory damages in section
2707(c) which states that "[tihe court may assess as damages ... under this section the sum
of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff... but in no case shall a person entitled to
recover receive less than the sum of $1,000." 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (1994).
189 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 444.
190 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 457.
191 The sole issue before the court of appeals was whether the seizure of a computer, used
to operate a BBS, containing private e-mail which had been sent to (stored on) the BBS, but
not read (received) by the intended recipients, constituted an unlawful intercept under
Title I. Id. at 458.
192 Title I awards statutory damages in section 2520(c)(2)(B) which states that "[tihe court
may assess as statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of
violation or $10,000." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (1994).
19 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458. The court of appeals narrowed the issue by stating
that the issue is not whether e-mail can be "intercepted," because it can. Id. at 461.
Instead, at issue was what constitutes an illegal "intercept." Id.
'1 Id. at 460-62.
195 See supra note 113 for the definition of an "electronic communication."
196 See supra note 120 for the definition of an "intercept."
197 Section 2510(18) defines "aural transfer" as "a transfer containing the human voice at
any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(18) (1994).
198 Section 2510(17) defines "electronic storage" as "any temporary, intermediate storage of
a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17) (1994).
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"electronic storage" of such communication.'" This distinction, the court
of appeals added, was critical to determining what constituted an
interception. 200 The court of appeals reasoned that Congress used the
word "transfer" in the definition of "electronic communication" and
omitted any "electronic storage" of such communication because it did
not intend for "intercept" to apply to an "electronic communication"
held in "electronic storage." 201 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that
the Secret Service seizure of the BBS, which contained the private,
unread e-mail, was not an illegal interception because the
communications were in storage.20 2 In other words, the Secret Service
did not violate Title I of the ECPA, but it did violate Title II of the
ECPA.203
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached its holding by
determining the legislative intent through the plain language of the
ECPA, corroborating its decision by analyzing the ECPA's legislative
history.2 4 First, the court of appeals noted, as did the district court, that
the Senate Report accompanying the ECPA indicated that Congress did
not intend to change the definition of "intercept." 205 Second, the court of
appeals relied on the fundamental rule that when construing a statute
the court should not confine its interpretation to the one portion at
issue.20 6 Rather, the court should consider the whole statute.2 7 Thus, the
19 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461. See also United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836
(1996) (following this definitional interpretation).200 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461.
20 Id. at 461-62. A stored "wire communication" is subject to different treatment than a
stored "electronic communication." Id. at 461 n.7. Generally, a search warrant, rather than
a court order, is required to obtain access to the "contents" of a stored "electronic
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994). In contrast, compliance with the more
stringent court "intercept" order in section 2518 is required to obtain access to a stored
"wire communication" because section 2703 clearly applies only to a stored "electronic
communication," not to a stored "wire communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 67-68 (1986).
22 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
2 3 Id. at 462.
2D4 Id. The court of appeals noted that while the goal of statutory construction is to
ascertain legislative intent through the plain language of a statute, "when interpreting a
statute as complex as the Wiretap Act, which is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity, . . . it [is] appropriate to note the legislative history for confirmation of . ..
Congress' intent." Id.
m Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462. The Senate Report explains that "[slection 101 (a) (3)
of the ECPA amends the definition of the term "intercept" . . . to cover electronic
communications.... The definition of "intercept" under current law is retained ... except
that the term "or other" is inserted after "aural." Id. (quoting S. REP No. 99-541, at 13
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,3567).
206 Id.
M7Id.
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court of appeals concluded that neither the ECPA nor its legislative
history indicated that Congress intended for conduct punishable under
Title II to also be punishable under Title 1.208
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that the
distinctions between the Titles persuasively indicated that Congress did
not intend for conduct clearly prohibited under Title II to furnish the
basis for a civil remedy under Title 1.209 First, the requirements for
authorization to "intercept" an "electronic communication" under Title I
are substantively different from the requirements for accessing the
"contents" of a stored "electronic communication" under Title 1I.210
Unlike Title II, which only requires the government to obtain a search
warrant to access a stored "electronic communication," 211 Title I requires
that the government procure a court "intercept" order to obtain an
"electronic communication" in transit.212 Second, a court "intercept"
order authorizing the seizure of an "electronic communication" under
Title I directs the government to comply with additional procedural
requirements that a search warrant authorizing access to a stored
"electronic communication" under Title II does not impose.213 Unlike a
search warrant under Title II, a court "intercept" order under Title I
Id. at 462-63.
w
9 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-63.210 Id.
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)-(2) (1994). A "judge of competent jurisdiction" may approve an
application to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication if the application
includes: (a) the name of the officer making the application; (b) a full and complete
statement of the facts which justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i)
details as to the particular offense, (ii) the nature and location of the facilities where the
communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person who committed
the offense, if known; (c) a statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed; (d) a statement about the period of time for which the
interception is required; (e) a statement of facts about all previous applications for the
same individual; and (0 if the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results obtained to date. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a)-(f) (1994). In addition,
the "judge of competent jurisdiction" has the authority to require the applicant to furnish
additional evidence in support of the application. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2) (1994). Section
2510(9) defines a "judge of competent jurisdiction" as:
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of
appeals; and (b) a judge of any court of general jurisdiction of a State
court of appeals who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter
orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic
communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(9) (1994).213 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463.
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includes four additional directives.214 First, the court order must not be
for any period longer than is necessary. 215 Second, the court order must
be executed as soon as practicable.216 Third, the court order must be
conducted in a way that minimizes the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception. 217 Fourth, the court order must
pertain to the investigation of an offense enumerated in section 2516.218
In light of these significant differences in substantive and procedural
requirements, the court of appeals concluded that Congress did not
intend for conduct punishable under Title H to also be punishable under
Title J.219
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's reliance on the Turk220 definition of "intercept," as
originally applied to a "wire communication," and merely extended it to
include an "electronic communication." 221 Thus, the interception of an
"electronic communication" requires that the law enforcement agency
participate in the contemporaneous acquisition of the communication
through the use of a device. 2m However, as anyone familiar with e-mail
can attest, this definition of "intercept" poses some serious problems for
214 See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
215 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994). Section 2518(5) directs that "[n]o order... may authorize...
for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in
any event longer than thirty days." Id.
216 Id. Section 2518(5) directs that "[e]very order.., shall contain a provision that the
authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable." Id.217 Id. Section 2518 (5) directs that "[e]very order... shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of the communications not otherwise subject to interception
under this chapter." Id.
218 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
219 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. To further reinforce the court of appeal's holding
that Congress intended to draw distinctions between communications in "transit" and
communications in "electronic storage," the court emphasized the ECPA legislative
history's explanation about the prohibition of disclosure in section 2702(a) of Title II and
in section 2511(3) of Title I. Id. at 463 n. 8 (citing S. REP. No. 99-541, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess.
37, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3591). Section 2702(a) of Title II (chapter 121)
prohibits "an electronic communication service to the public... [from] divulging. . . the
contents of a communication while it is in electronic storage." 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994). In
comparison, section 2511(3) of Title I (chapter 119) prohibits "an electronic
communications service to the public... from divulging the contents of a communication.
.. while in transmission." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).
2m See supra note 186 (explaining that the Turk decision relied upon by the district court).
221 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994),
affg 816 F. Supp. 432, 441-43 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (analogizing that the seizure of an
"electronic communication" that had been sent, but not yet received by its addressee was
the same as the seizure of a tape recording).222 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 441-42.
Steere: Keeping "Private E-Mail" Private: A Proposal to Modify the Electr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
264 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
a citizen's right to privacy."2  For example, the Turk definition of
intercept effectively renders the distinction between the authorized
interception of an "electronic communication" under Title I and the
authorized access to a stored "electronic communication" under Title II
meaningless. 224 No law enforcement agency need comply with the more
stringent substantive and procedural requirements necessary for a court
"intercept" order under Title r22 when the agency can merely wait to
access the desired "electronic communication" held in "electronic
storage" with a warrant under Title I.226 Thus, because a law
enforcement agency can wait until an "electronic communication
service" holds an "electronic communication" in "electronic storage" and
then gain access without a court "intercept" order, Congress must
reexamine the ECPA.227 The following proposed modifications to the
ECPA seek to give an "electronic communication" the same level of
protection that a "wire" or "oral" communication receives.228
VI. MODIFYING THE ECPA
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past
or the present are certain to miss the future.229
When the framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the
arbitrary use of government power to maintain surveillance over
citizens, only limited methods existed to intrude into those citizens'
"houses, papers, and effects." 23° During the intervening 200 years,
development of new methods of communication and devices for
m See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 110, at 25 (arguing that a tape recorded conversation
is a completed communication, but an undelivered e-mail is more like a wiretap because it
is seized before it is completed).
224 For a chart diagramming how the Turk definition of "intercept" limits the interception
of an electronic communication to situations where the government monitors keystrokes,
taps a data line, or reroutes an e-mail to provide contemporaneous acquisition, see
CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 110, at 23 fig.2.1.
225 See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (explaining the different substantive and
procedural requirements).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994) (explaining the prerequisites for access to stored
communications).
22 The Steve Jackson Games decision illustrates the problem with merely extending the
protection of an existing statute to cover a new technology without revising the entire
statute to conform to the unique characteristics of the technology. If Congress chooses this
method of legislating, it should perform a comprehensive evaluation of the technology to
ensure that all of the defined terms and provisions of the existing statute conform to the
unique attributes of the new technology.
m90 See infra notes 230-54 and accompanying text.
229 John F. Kennedy, Frankfurt, West Germany (June 25,1963).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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surveillance2 31 has dramatically expanded the opportunity for such
intrusions. 232 As society further incorporates the use of e-mail via the
Internet into our everyday life, it will become the mode of
communication families and friends use most to communicate.23 3 In the
future, courts will call more frequently upon the Katz "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test and the ECPA to determine the fate of
privacy rights implicitly guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 23
To ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment, this
Note argues that the law must advance with technology. Thus, Congress
must clarify the distinction between an "electronic communication" in
"transit" as opposed to an "electronic communication" held in
"electronic storage" to protect a citizen's right of privacy. Otherwise, the
precious right implicit in the Fourth Amendment will gradually erode.
To address this concern, this Note proposes the following modifications
to Title I and Title I. These modifications will equalize the protection
that the ECPA gives an "electronic communication" when compared to a
"wire" or "oral" communication. 2m
A. The Proposed Modifications to Title I
The ECPA defines the terms used in Title I and Title II in section
2510 of Title I.236 By rewriting four of these definitions, Congress will
clarify the difference between an "electronic communication" in "transit"
231 For information on one device called the Forward Looking Infrared Device (FLIR)
which detects heat emanating from certain objects, even if inside the home, see Scott J.
Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordinary Device Exception: Redefining the Scope
of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 1071 (1996).
232 The telephone is the most obvious example because its widespread use made it
technologically possible to "intercept" citizens' communications without entering homes
or other private places. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
3The Internet has experienced phenomenal growth. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
831 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In 1981 the Internet linked fewer than 300 computers. Id. In 1989 the
number of computers stood at fewer than 90,000 and by 1993 that number grew to over
1,000,000 computers. Id. In 1997, the number of computers in the United States stands at
over 5,640,000 and that does not even include the personal computers people use to access
the Internet using a modem. Id. In all, 40 million people around the world access the
Internet and that number is expected to increase to 200 million Internet users by the year
1999. Id.
234 See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND.
L.J. 549 (1990). The courts determine the level of privacy and freedom for the whole
community when they decide a Fourth Amendment issue. Id. at 550. If the courts give
law enforcement more investigatory power to use in their quest to apprehend criminals,
the effect on privacy rights of the community at large grows in "geometric proportion."
Id. at 550.
m See infra notes 236-54 and accompanying text.
236 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
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as opposed to an "electronic communication" held in "electronic storage"
and will equalize the protection afforded a "wire," "oral," and
"electronic" communication so that no formalistic distinctions occur.237
First, Congress should add "between the point of origin and the point when
the user 3 receives any communication," as well as "and such term includes
any temporary, intermediate storage incidental to the transmission thereof to
the definition of "electronic communication" in section 2510 (12), 239 along
with a new subsection (E), so that the term reads:
237 This Note argues that by equalizing the protection given to a "wire," "oral," and
"electronic" communication, no technology will have an advantage over another. In other
words, if all technologies receive the same protection, then Congress will eliminate the
formalistic distinctions that occur. For example, adding the human voice to an "electronic
communication" might qualify the entire communication as a "wire communication,"
which means that the communication would receive significantly more protection. See
supra, notes 139-45 and accompanying text (explaining that a "wire communication"
receives more protection than an "electronic communication"). This formalistic distinction
occurs because the definition of a "wire communication" specifically includes "any aural
transfer made in whole or in part ...." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994). An "aural transfer"
means "a transfer containing the human voice at any point ...." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18)
(1994). Moreover, "[tihe conversion of a [human] voice signal to digital form for purposes
of transmission does not render the communication non-wire. In other words, the term
'wire communication' includes . . .digitized communications to the extent that they
contain the human voice .... S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3566. In contrast, "a communication is an electronic communication . .. if it ...
cannot fairly be characterized as containing the human voice. Communications consisting
solely of data... are electronic communications." Id. at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3568. Moreover, the definition of an "electronic communication" specifically reads
that it does not include "any wire.., communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(A) (1994).
Formalistic distinctions, such as the one presented above, will not occur if Congress
makes three changes to equalize the protection given to an "electronic communication" in
relation to a "wire" or "oral" communication. First, Congress must remove section 2516(3)
which addresses the authorization for interception of an "electronic communication" and
add "electronic communication" to sections 2516(1) and (2), possibly reformulating the list
of government officials who may authorize an application for a court "intercept" order as
well as the list of crimes that qualify for a court "intercept" order. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1994); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text. Second, Congress must add an
"electronic communication" to sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) so that the statutory
exclusionary rule covers an "electronic communication." See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)
(1994); see also Leib, supra note 139 (explaining why Congress should add an "electronic
communication" to the statutory exclusionary rule and reject the "good faith" exception).
Third, and for the purpose of this Note, Congress must clarify the distinction between an
"electronic communication" in transit and an "electronic communication" held in
"electronic storage." If Congress makes these changes, citizens will have no incentive to
use one communication over another, or fear that one provides more protection than
another does.
238 Section 2510(13) defines a "user" as "any person or entity who uses an electronic
communication service; and is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage
in such use." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) (1994).
239For the current definition of "electronic communication," see supra note 113.
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"electronic communication" means any transfer between
the point of origin and the point when the user receives any
communication of signs, signal, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that iffects
interstate or foreign commerce, and such term includes any
temporary, intermediate storage incidental to the transmission
thereof, but does not include-
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as
defined in section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a
financial institution in a communications system
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;
(E) any electronic storage of such communication for backup
protection (as defined in section 2510 (17)), except as
provided for in Title II;
Second, Congress should remove the language "any electronic
storage of such communication" and add "any temporary, intermediate
storage incidental to the transmission thereof, but does not include" to the
definition of a "wire communication" in section 2510(1),240 along a new
subsection (A), so that the term reads:
"wire communication" means any aural transfer in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated
by any person engaged in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate
or foreign commerce and such term includes aff
elp-Owonie starage ef -uh eommnk-m----nation any temporary,
intermediate storage incidental to the transmission thereof, but
does not include-
240 For the current definition of a "wire communication," see supra note 111.
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(A) any electronic storage of such communication241 for
purposes of backup protection (as defined in section 2510
(17)), except as provided for in Title JI;242
The first two proposed definitions have two effects. First, the new
definition in 2510(12) clarifies that an "electronic communication" is in
transit from the time the sender dispatches the communication until the
recipient ("user") receives the communication.243 Second, the addition of
subsection (E) to section 2510(12) and subsection (A) to section 2510(1)
clarifies the difference between both an "electronic communication" and
a "wire communication" in transit under Title I, from such
communications held in "electronic storage" under Title II, as specified
next in the proposed definition of "electronic storage."
Third, Congress should completely redefine the term "electronic
storage" in section 2510 (17)244 to read:
"electronic storage" may occur only after an electronic
communication service discloses to the user in the initial
service agreement that the electronic communication service
will store such communication and the user elects to have such
communication stored for purposes of backup protection, but
such term does not include-
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage which is incidental to
the transmission of such communication between the point of
origin and the point when the user receives such
communication;
The effect of the third proposed definition is to separate a "user's"
"reasonable expectation of privacy" into two distinct points in time.245
The first part consists of the "user's" "reasonable expectation of privacy"
241 Voice mail is an example of a "wire communication" that an "electronic
communication service" could store for backup protection once the user receives the
communication. Voice mail is a "wire communication" because the communication
contains the human voice. See supra note 237.
242 Title II is codified in chapter 121 of the UNITED STATES CODE. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text.243 This effect takes into account the logic that any communication is in transit and subject
to interception from the time the sender dispatches the communication to the recipient
until the recipient receives the communication. The proposed definition incorporates this
logic so that an "electronic communication" receives the same protection from interception
that a "wire" or "oral" communication receives.
244 For the current definition of "electronic storage," see supra note 198.
245 For an explanation of the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, see supra notes
55-64 and accompanying text.
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before receipt of the "electronic" or "wire" communication," 246 while the
second part consists of the "user's" "reasonable expectation of privacy"
after receipt of the "electronic" or "wire" communication. 247 In regard to
the effect of the first part on e-mail,248 proposed subsection 2510(12) and
subsection 2510(17) read together impart that a "communication service"
is merely a temporary custodian of an "electronic communication" which
the "user" has not yet received. 249 But in regard to the second part on
246 A review of the ECPA's legislative history indicates that a communication technology is
only included as a protected technology if the general public cannot "intercept" the
communication. For example, when Congress passed the ECPA in 1986, the definitions of
both a "wire communication" and an "electronic communication" excluded "the radio
portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless
telephone handset and the base unit." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (12) (1986). But in 1994,
Congress amended both definitions and removed the exclusion because technological
advancements increased a "user's" "reasonable expectation of privacy." 18 U.S.C. §
2510(1), (12) (1994). In addition, the ECPA's legislative history illustrates that Congress
addressed the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in the definition of an "oral
communication" in section 2510(2). See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 57, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178 (explainingthat the definition was intended to reflect the existing
law in Katz). Under section 2510(2), only when an "oral communication" is "uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation. .. ." is such communication protected.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994). See also supra note 112 for the current definition of an "oral
communication." Unlike the definition of an "oral communication," the definition of
neither "wire communication" nor an "electronic communication" contain the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" language. Thus, a "wire" or an "electronic" communication could
possibly violate the ECPA regardless of any "reasonable expectation of privacy" based on
their inclusion in the ECPA without the Katz language. No case has ever dealt directly
with the issue of an e-mail message and a "reasonable expectation of privacy." But the
Fourth Amendment would probably require some kind of warrant. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-
647, at 22 (1986).
247 At first, this Note was also to argue that an additional subsection be added to Title I,
section 2518 (Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications). The
purpose of the subsection was to give government agents the right to use the backup
preservation provisions in section 2704 to preserve unread e-mail or voice mail in a user's
mailbox during the interim period when the government agency waited for the approval
of a court "intercept" order. However, subsection 2518(7) already allows a government
agent, under emergency situations, to "intercept such wire, oral, or electronic
communication if an application for an order approving the interception is made ...
within forty-eight hours after such interception has occurred, or begins to occur." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1994). While this subsection appears adequate, Congress could expand
its coverage to maintain the proper balance with the legitimate needs of law enforcement.
248 In regard to voice mail, the effect of proposed subsection 2510(1) and subsection
2510(17) read together impart that a "communication service" is merely a temporary
custodian of a "wire communication" that the "user" has not yet received. See also infra
notes 249-51.
249 If the third party is merely the temporary custodian of the information, and not the
owner, then the defendant can prevent the government from introducing the evidence
based on the Fifth Amendment. OFFICE OF TECHNoLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECrONC
SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 50 (1985).
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e-mailA° once the "user" receives the communication, one of two things
may occur depending on the "user's" election in the initial service
agreement. If the "user" elected to have the "electronic communication
service" store the communication for backup protection, then the
"user's" "reasonable expectation of privacy" diminishes, and Title II
applies.251  But if the "user" did not elect to have the "electronic
communication service" store the "electronic communication" for
backup protection, the "user" downloads the e-mail to a local computer
and the "electronic communication service" automatically deletes any e-
mail from the "user's" mailbox upon the "user's" exit from the system.252
Hence, the Title I prohibition on interception applies.
20 In regard to voice mail, once the "user" receives the "wire communication," one of two
choices may occur depending on the "user's" election in the initial service agreement. If
the "user" elected to have the "electronic communication service" store the
communication for backup protection, then the "user's" "reasonable expectation of
privacy" diminishes and Title II applies. But if the "user" did not elect to have the
"electronic communication service" store the communication for backup protection, then
the "user" listens to the voice mail and deletes the communication, or the "electronic
communication service" automatically deletes the received communication upon the
.user's" exit. Hence, Title I applies. Otherwise, the initial service agreement can allow the
"user" to voluntarily leave a received communication on the system upon the "user's" exit
without the "electronic communication service" deleting the received communication, but
then Title II would apply.
251 In analogous situations, a person who relinquishes control to a third party, such as a
check to a bank, assumes the risk that the third party will give the information to a law
enforcement agency. See supra, notes 81-83 and accompanying text (explaining the
"assumption of the risk" doctrine). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976)
(holding that a bank depositor had no protectable Fourth Amendment interests in
microfilm records of his financial transactions because by revealing his affairs to the bank,
he assumed the risk that such information would be conveyed to the government). But
Congress reversed the result in Miller in the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 12 U.S.C. §
3401, H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong. at 23 n.40 (1986). Similarly, the Senate Report
recommending passage of the ECPA explicitly states that Title II (chapter 121) was
"modeled after" the Right to Financial Privacy Act "to protect privacy interests in personal
and proprietary information, while protecting the Government's legitimate law
enforcement needs." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3557. Thus, Congress intended that Title II protect the privacy expectations of citizens
who relinquish control to a third party, and maintain the legitimate needs of law
enforcement agencies.
252 The two main protocols for accessing remote mail are Post Office Protocol ("POP") and
Internet Message Access Protocol ("IMAP"). Terry Gray, Message Access Paradigms and
Protocols (visited March 4, 1998) <ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/mail/imap.vs.pop>. The
protocols can use any of the three different paradigms for accessing remote mailboxes:
"off-line," "on-line," or "disconnected." Id. In "off-line" operation, the "user's" mail
program fetches the e-mail from the "electronic communication service's" mail server,
returns to the computer where the "user's" mail program is operating, and then deletes the
e-mail from the mail server. Id. In "on-line" operation, the "user's" mail program leaves
the e-mail on the "electronic communication service's" mail server and manipulates the
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Fourth, Congress should add "wire or" to the definition of an
"electronic communication system" in section 2510(14)25 so that the term
reads:
"electronic communication service" means any wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photoelectronic
facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related
electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications;
The effect of the proposed definition in section 2510(14) is relevant to the
proposed reforms in section 2703 of Title II.
B. The Proposed Modifications to Title H
The ECPA addresses stored "wire" and "electronic"
communications in Title II. By modifying two of these sections, Congress
will balance the protection afforded an "electronic communication" held
in "electronic storage" and a "wire communication" held in "electronic
storage" so that the protection is equal. First, Congress should add "a
wire or" to subsection (a) of section 2703 (Requirements for governmental
access) so that subsection 2703(a) reads:
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in
electronic storage.-A governmental entity may require
the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication
service of the contents of a wire or an electronic
communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and
eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
e-mail remotely. Id. In "disconnected" operation, the "user's" mail program connects to
the "electronic communication service's" mail server, makes a cache copy of selected
messages, and then disconnects from the server, later to reconnect and re-synchronize with
the mail server. Id. Of these different paradigms, POP only uses the "off-line" access
paradigm, but IMAP can use all three paradigms. Id. Important to this Note, in both "on-
line" and "disconnected" access paradigms, e-mail is left on the "electronic
communication service's" mail server. Thus, the initial service agreement could provide
the "user" two choices. The first choice requires the "electronic communication service" to
delete any received e-mail messages left on the system upon the "user's" exit from the
system. The second choice allows the "electronic communication service" to provide
backup protection for those e-mail messages voluntarily left on the system upon the
"user's" exit from the system.
2m See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (1994).
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equivalent State warrant. A governmental entity may
require the disclosure by a provider of electronic
communications services of the contents of an electronic
communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one
hundred and eighty days by the means available under
subsection (b) of this section.
Second, Congress should add "wire or" to subsection (a) (1) of
section 2704 (Backup preservation) so that subsection 2704 (a) (1) reads:
(a) Backup preservation.-(1) A governmental entity
acting under section 2703(b) (2) may include in its
subpoena or court order a requirement that the service
provider to whom the request is directed create a backup
copy of the contents of the wire or electronic
communications sought in order to preserve those
communications. Without notifying the subscriber or
customer of such subpoena or court order, such service
provider shall create such backup copy as soon as
practicable consistent with its regular business practices
and shall confirm to the governmental entity that such
backup copy has been made. Such backup copy shall be
created within two business days after receipt by the
service provider of the subpoena or court order.
Similar to the effect of the proposed changes to Title I, the changes to
Title H further clarify the separation between a user's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" before receipt of the communication and after
receipt of the communication. After the "user" receives a
communication, the person must choose whether the "electronic
communication service" will store the communication or not. If the
"1user" elects to have the communication stored, then the government
need only comply with the less stringent requirements in Title II. But the
government must comply with the more stringent requirements in Title I
at anytime before receipt of the communication.
C. Why Adopt the Proposed Modifications?
The proposed modifications will improve the Court's Fourth
Amendment and ECPA jurisprudence in two distinct ways. First, the
proposed modifications will put integrity back into the true historical
purpose of the Fourth Amendment because they will ensure citizens that
the Fourth Amendment acts as a limitation upon the exercise of
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government power. In this sense, the proposed modifications are really a
recognition of the reason the Framers of the Constitution drafted the
Fourth Amendment-to force government agents to respect a citizen's
right of privacy.
The second positive effect is that the proposed modifications will
realign the ECPA to more fairly and accurately represent the true
historical purpose for the Fourth Amendment. Fourth Amendment
rights concerning new communication technologies, such as e-mail, will
no longer turn on formalistic distinctions. Instead, the distinctions will
be fair and logical so that citizens will be secure in knowing that their
communication is free from government interception from the time they
speak or type until the time the recipient hears or reads the
communication. Consequently, citizens will enjoy the protection granted
to them by the Fourth Amendment. The privacy rights implicit in the
Fourth Amendment are a vital aspect of our society and citizens should
assume that they exist, unless clear and sensible reasons argue
otherwise.2, 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts have slowly muddied the effectiveness of the Fourth
Amendment with numerous subdoctrines that have lost sight of the
Amendment's true historical purpose. But Congress must see through
the murkiness of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and focus on the fact
that the Fourth Amendment is the one procedural safeguard in the
Constitution that protects citizens by preventing the government from
abusing its power. This concern motivated Congress to pass the federal
wiretap laws. Today, the ECPA is clearly the most important statute
dealing with the privacy of e-mail in cyberspace.
Congress wanted the ECPA to represent a fair balance between the
privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of
law enforcement agencies. But the formalistic distinction between an
"electronic communication" in "transit" and an "electronic
communication" held in "electronic storage" allows law enforcement
agencies to avoid the more stringent requirements for a court "intercept"
2 Professor Weinreb proclaims that Fourth Amendment notions of privacy and security
help us develop our personality by permitting us:
to leave our pajamas on the floor, the bed unmade and dishes in the
sink, pictures of secret heroes on the wall, a stack of comic books or
love letters on the shelf; it allows us to be sloppy or compulsively neat,
to enjoy what we have without exposing [ourselves] to the world.
Weinreb, supra note 8, at 53.
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order. If law enforcement agencies have the ability to sidestep the court
"intercept" order for an "electronic communication," then citizens who
communicate by "electronic communication" do not receive the same
protection from overzealous law enforcement agents as citizens who
communicate by "wire communication" or "oral communication." To
prevent this result, Congress should modify the ECPA.
The proposed modifications to the ECPA equalize the protection
given to an "electronic communication" when compared to a "wire" or
"oral" communication so that law enforcement agents must obtain a
court "intercept" order to obtain any communication from the time the
sender dispatches the communication until the time the recipient receives
the communication. Likewise, law enforcement agents must comply
with the less stringent requirements to obtain any communication held in
storage. If Congress gives an "electronic communication" the same level
of protection as the other forms of communication, the formalistic
distinctions will end, and the encouragement of emerging technologies
will begin. To encourage citizens' use of e-mail, Congress should restore
citizen confidence in e-mail privacy by modifying the ECPA to provide
an "electronic communication" the same level of protection that the other
forms of communication receive and counteract any further erosion of
Fourth Amendment rights.
-Robert S. Steere
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